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Many linguists have claimed that interlocutors transmit social 
information about their identities or relationships when 
interacting (e.g. Lakoff, 1973; Laver, 1974, 1975; Brown and 
Levinson, 1978, 1987; Scollon and Scollon, 1995; Coupland, 
2000). However, they have not explained how this information is 
transmitted and recovered. Based on relevance theory (Sperber 
and Wilson, 1986, 1995; Wilson and Sperber, 2002), this paper 
argues that speakers transmit such social information implicitly 
and that hearers can recover it as a consequence of their 
expectations of relevance. The stylistic choices made by speakers 
can lead hearers to recover implicatures that they can use to obtain 
a specific type of cognitive effect referring to different aspects of the 






Grice’s (1975) and the Speech Act theory’s models of 
communication overlooked the fact that utterances do not always 
exclusively transmit important and new information. As Coupland 
comments, this might have been due to a pervading ideology in 
Linguistics in which “Real talk is talk that ‘gets the stuff done’, where 
‘stuff’ does not include ‘relational stuff’. Within this ideology sociality is 
marginalised as a ‘small’ concern, and language for transacting business 
and other commercial or institutional instrumentalities is 
foregrounded” (2000: 7-8).1 However, as Lakoff correctly claimed, “[...] 
                                                 
1
 Nonetheless, as Mills also claims, “[…] there are many things happening in 
conversation other than relating to others and giving information: achieving long-term 
and short-term goals, working out those goals, trying to understand ourselves and 
others, enjoying ourselves, and so on” (2003: 38). 
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in most informal conversations, actual communication of important 
ideas is secondary to merely reaffirming and strengthening 
relationships”, so that “[...] very seldom indeed is a speech act designed 
purely to impart factual information [...]” (1973: 298). In fact, as Scollon 
and Scollon pointed out, “[…] when we communicate with others we 
simultaneously communicate some amount of information and indicate 
our current expectations about the relationship between or among 
participants” (1995: 138). 
Today, nobody would probably deny that utterances reveal 
aspects of our social identity and relationships. In his work on phatic 
communion, Laver (1974, 1975) related the usage of two types of 
phatic utterances to the interlocutors’ social relationship, and concluded 
that these utterances are very important linguistic devices for social 
interaction because of the indexical information that they transmit about 
the interlocutors’ social relation and roles. Laver’s (1974, 1975) work 
fully flourished in Brown and Levinson’s (1978, 1987) face-saving 
approach to politeness.2 These authors proposed that individuals assess 
three sociological variables –their relative power, their social distance 
and the rank of imposition of their acts– in order to determine if an act 
involves some damage to their face. As a result of that assessment, 
interlocutors select the best linguistic strategy that allows them to 
communicate their messages in the most effective way and protect their 
face. Therefore, a particular linguistic strategy selected may also convey 
information about the interlocutors’ social roles, attributes and 
identities. 
However, even if these authors have suggested that particular 
types of utterances transmit information about the interlocutors’ social 
relationships, roles and identities, linguists have not satisfactorily 
explained how interlocutors can communicate this information.3 This 
paper argues that interlocutors transmit such information implicitly. 
Based on relevance theory and its approach to style (Sperber and 
Wilson, 1986, 1995; Wilson and Sperber, 2002), it argues that, guided 
                                                 
2 This approach rests on the assumptions that individuals normally abide by the 
Cooperative Principle (Grice, 1975) when communicating, and that they are interested in 
preserving their face from the potential aggressions deriving from particular acts in 
social interaction. 
3 See Padilla Cruz (2007) for a relevance-theoretic account of the transmission of 
information about politeness systems. 
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by their expectations of relevance, hearers can exploit the stylistic 
choices made by speakers when formulating their utterances so as to 
recover a specific type of implicatures that they can use to obtain a 
particular type of cognitive effects. 
 
 
2. Relevance theory and style 
 
Relevance theory (Sperber and Wilson, 1986, 1995; Wilson and 
Sperber, 2002) explains why hearers select a specific interpretation out 
of the many possible interpretations that an utterance can have. It is 
based on relevance, a property of utterances defined in terms of cognitive 
effects and cognitive effort. Cognitive effects are strengthening or contradiction 
of previous information, and contextual implications, i.e. information that 
can only be derived from the interaction of the information 
communicated by utterances with the information that the hearer 
possesses. Cognitive effort results from the effort of memory to 
construct a suitable context for interpreting utterances or from their 
psychological complexity (Wilson, 1993).  
For the hearer to recover the interpretation of an utterance that 
the speaker intended to communicate, he has to contextualise it by 
relating the explicit and implicit information he obtains to a subset of 
the information he has already stored, which constitutes his context for 
interpretation (Sperber and Wilson, 1995: 108).4 The hearer will choose 
a particular interpretation of an utterance if its processing yields a 
satisfactory amount of cognitive effects that offset the cognitive effort 
invested, i.e. if he finds that interpretation relevant. But the hearer will 
only process an utterance if he has some expectations of relevance and 
thinks that he will indeed obtain those effects. Hearers are always 
interested in achieving the optimal relevance of the information that they 
receive, so utterances must communicate a presumption of their own 
optimal relevance: their production must be accompanied by a 
guarantee that their processing will produce cognitive effects that 
compensate the hearer’s effort, and they must be the most relevant 
ostensive stimuli that the speaker can think of, depending on her 
abilities and preferences (Sperber and Wilson, 1986, 1995: 157, 270; 
                                                 
4 Sperber and Wilson (1986, 1995) distinguish two types of implicatures: implicated 
premises and implicated conclusions. 
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Wilson and Sperber, 2002: 251, 256-257). 
When communicating, the speaker has an informative intention –
i.e. the set of assumptions that she wants to communicate (Sperber and 
Wilson, 1995: 58)– which she can make more or less manifest to the 
hearer.5 The more manifest she makes her informative intention, the 
stronger communication is, for the hearer is more certain about the 
assumptions that the speaker communicates. However, the speaker can 
leave implicit as many assumptions as she thinks that the hearer can 
retrieve in exchange for an acceptable level of cognitive effort, which 
must be compensated by a satisfactory amount of cognitive effects.  
The style of utterances arises as a consequence of the speaker’s 
desire to be optimally relevant (Sperber and Wilson, 1995: 219). Hence, 
their stylistic features and peculiarities must be understood as little or 
great obstacles that may render more difficult the recovery of cognitive 
effects, as they may increase the hearer’s cognitive effort. The cognitive 
effects that a hearer can obtain as a result of the style of an utterance 
are poetic effects (Sperber and Wilson, 1995: 222). In some cases, poetic 
effects are not based on the transmission of completely new 
assumptions, but on an increase in the manifestness of assumptions 
that are weakly manifest in the hearer’s cognitive environment, i.e. weak 
implicatures. In other cases, poetic effects arise because utterances 
contain concepts with rather rich or complex encyclopaedic entries 
towards which the speaker draws the hearer’s attention (Pilkington, 
1989, 1991, 1992, 2000).6  
Accordingly, the repetition of a term in the next utterances 
increases their psychological complexity and the hearer’s cognitive 
effort. Assuming that the speaker is aiming at optimal relevance, the 
hearer will think that the increase in his effort must be compensated by 
cognitive effects that he would not obtain from a different formulation 
of those utterances (Trotter, 1992: 11): 
 
(1)  I shall never, never smoke again. 
(2)  My childhood days are gone, gone. (Sperber and Wilson, 1995: 
                                                 
5 The notion of manifestness refers to the possibility of having a mental representation of 
a particular assumption (Sperber and Wilson, 1995: 58). 
6 Since the access to those concepts requires the activation of the assumptions stored 
under their encyclopaedic entries, the time employed by the hearer to process them 
influences the recovery of poetic effects. 





When processing (1), the hearer may conclude that the speaker 
is expressing a high degree of compromise with the resolution that she 
has just made, maybe because she feels that the hearer could be 
sceptical about it. On the other hand, when processing (2) the hearer 
will have to expand his context for interpretation and resort to 
additional implicated premises (3), which will allow him to recover a 
number of implicated conclusions (4). Obviously, the degree of 
manifestness of some of those assumptions can be very high or low –
i.e. they can be strong or weak implicatures– and the hearer may even 
resort to other assumptions on his own responsibility: 
 
(3) a. Childhood days are happy. 
b. Childhood days are innocent. 
(4) a. The speaker’s days of happiness are gone. 
b. The speaker’s days of innocence are gone. (Sperber and 
 Wilson, 1995: 219) 
 
The expectations of relevance that utterances generate may 
lead the hearer to recover implicatures that he can use in his inferential 
processes in order to obtain cognitive effects that offset his effort. As 
has been seen, in some cases a special type of cognitive effect arises as a 
consequence of the style of utterances. Similarly, guided by his 
expectations of relevance, the hearer can recover a wide array of 
implicatures about the speaker’s identity, role, personality, character, 
mood, etc. from the linguistic evidence that she provides. Such 
implicatures may lead him to obtain another specific type of cognitive 
effects, as the next section shows. 
 
 
3. Social effects 
 
Imagine a solidarity politeness system (Scollon and Scollon, 1995)7 
in which an individual asks another to close the window by means of an 
utterance such as (5) instead of another shorter possible formulation, 
                                                 
7 A solidarity politeness system is characterised by the fact that both interlocutors have 
the same power and socially close. 
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such as (6): 
 
(5) Come on, John, shut the window, please! 
(6) Shut the window! 
 
(5) could apparently seem more difficult to process than the 
direct imperative in (6). However, given the appropriate tone of voice 
and paralinguistic expressions, it can make the hearer obtain cognitive 
effects regarding the speaker’s polite attitude when addressing him, 
which he would not probably obtain from (6). Additionally, by uttering 
(5) the speaker can make more strongly or weakly manifest to the 
hearer assumptions such as those in (7): 
 
(7) a. The speaker uses this utterance because she feels that we are 
socially close. 
b. The speaker uses this utterance because she does not have 
more power than me. 
c. The speaker uses this utterance because she feels affect 
towards me. 
 d. The speaker is treating me as a friend. 
 e. The speaker knows that she can ask me to close the window. 
 
 Consider now the case of phatic utterances, which are 
apparently irrelevant because the assumptions that they make manifest 
are already manifest in the hearer’s cognitive environment (e.g. Žegarac, 
1998).8 Even if interlocutors frequently resort to these utterances in 
different conversations, they make some stylistic changes. In some 
conversations, speakers repeat their orientation –personal, if the 
utterances refer to the interlocutors, or neutral, if they refer to the 
conversational setting (Laver, 1974, 1975)– but their propositional 
content can vary, for speakers can deal with different topics. By doing 
so, speakers can also make strongly or weakly manifest to hearers an 
infinite number of assumptions by means of the linguistic evidence 
provided by the utterances themselves, i.e. their propositional content. 
                                                 
8 As shown elsewhere, the usage of phatic utterances can generate expectations of 
relevance which lead hearers to recover strong or weak implicatures that yield cognitive 
effects about the politeness system established with the speaker (Padilla Cruz, 2004a, 
2004b, 2007). 
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Some of those assumptions will only be rather manifest in very specific 
contexts (Pilkington, 2000: 94). Therefore, the speakers’ informative 
intention might be very indeterminate and their hearers might not be 
able to determine if those assumptions are indeed part of their 
informative intention. The more evidence hearers have to think that 
their speakers intended to communicate them, the more strongly those 
assumptions are communicated. On the contrary, the less evidence they 
have, the more weakly those assumptions are communicated. 
Accordingly, in addition to assumptions referring to the 
speaker’s power or social distance, a neutral phatic utterance such as (8) 
may make manifest to the hearer assumptions like those in (9), while a 
personal phatic utterance such as (10) may make manifest to him 
assumptions like those in (11): 
 
(8) Nice weather! 
(9) a. The speaker is the sort of person who likes speaking about 
the weather. 
b. The speaker does not like dealing with personal topics. 
c. The speaker is showing her respect for my intimacy. 
d. The speaker has the same concept of nice weather as I do. 
e. The speaker takes nice weather to be sun and a temperature 
of 25ºC. 
f. The speaker likes nice weather. 
(10) Beautiful sweater! 
(11) a. The speaker likes speaking about clothes. 
b. The speaker is the sort of person who notices her hearer’s 
appearance. 
c. The speaker is the sort of person who cannot avoid personal 
topics. 
d. The speaker has the same tastes in clothes as I do. 
e. The speaker is showing her concern about me. 
f. The speaker likes signalling involvement. 
 
Guided by his expectations of relevance, the hearer may use 
those assumptions as strong or weak implicatures –depending on the 
way the speaker communicates them– and relate them to others that he 
has already stored. Thus, he can obtain further cognitive effects that 
make those utterances optimally relevant. As a result of such effects, he 
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can increase or enhance his knowledge of his interlocutor, his 
personality, character, behaviour, habits, etc. Furthermore, the hearer 
can store the assumptions resulting from those effects in his 
encyclopaedic memory as part of his frames or schemata about his 
interlocutor, so that he can access them afterwards. The way in which 
he stores them will directly influence the ease with which he will 
subsequently access them. This will in turn condition his use of such 
assumptions to process further information (Pilkington, 2000: 112). 
In an analogous way to Pilkington (1989, 1991, 1992, 2000) and 
Sperber and Wilson (1986, 1995), I would like to call social effects the 
different cognitive effects regarding diverse aspects of his social 
relationship with his interlocutor, the sociological variables intervening 
in social interaction, the speaker’s personality, status, role, mood, 
character, habits, etc. that a hearer can obtain from the processing of 
utterances. Like poetic effects, social effects arise as a consequence of 
the manifestness to the hearer of a wide array of strong or weak 
implicatures of a rather varied content that he can subsequently use. 
Following Jary (1998), those strong or weak implicatures can be 
considered beneficial because they contribute to a more complete and 
accurate knowledge of the social reality in which the hearer is 
interacting. Social effects are an immediate consequence of the 
expectations of relevance that utterances generate, and result in a better 
knowledge of the other interlocutor and the social relationship that the 
hearer maintains with her. Consequently, social effects are essential for 
understanding the social reality in which individuals interact. They are a 
natural consequence of the human cognitive tendency to achieve an 
optimal level of relevance of the stimuli processed, i.e. to obtain 
enough cognitive effects that offset the cognitive effort invested to 
process utterances.  
Social effects are based on the transmission and recovery of a 
set of strong or weak implicatures. The weaker those implicatures, the 
more likely the hearer will derive conclusions about his interlocutor or 
their social relationship on his own responsibility. Therefore, for the 
hearer to get a correct appraisal of the social reality in which he is 
interacting or his interlocutor’s identity, among the assumptions 
constituting the speaker’s informative intention must be those 
implicatures. Moreover, the speaker must communicate them to the 
hearer in an overt way if she really wants to prevent him from coming 
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to wrong conclusions about her identity or their social relationship 




By means of stylistic characteristics of utterances such as their 
content, the speaker can make more or less manifest a wide array of 
assumptions about her identity, role, character, mood, personality, 
habits, etc. Guided by his expectations of relevance, the hearer can 
exploit them to obtain further cognitive effects. The degree of 
manifestness of those assumptions varies depending on the way the 
speaker communicates them, so the hearer may use some of them on 
his own responsibility and come to undesired or wrong conclusions. 
This paper has proposed to term such cognitive effects social effects 
because they allude to features of the speaker’s identity, social role or 
attributes, or to the interlocutors’ social relationship. It has shown that 
social effects are based on the transmission and recovery of strong or 
weak implicatures, they arise as a direct consequence of the continuous 
human search for the optimal relevance of the stimuli processed, they 
may make some apparently irrelevant utterances become relevant, and 
they contribute to a better knowledge of the social reality in which 
individuals interact. Thus, this paper has tried to account for the way in 
which information about the interlocutors’ identities, social roles, 
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